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NOTE 
EXPANDING THE 
JURISDICTIONAL REACH FOR 
INTENTIONAL TORTS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CYBER 
CONTACTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last century, the courts have slowly relaxed 
Constitutional constraints on the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over out of state defendants.1 Recently, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit permitted a California district 
court to exercise jurisdiction over an out of state defendant on 
the basis of a letter sent by the defendant in Georgia, to a 
third party in Virginia.2 It appears that, at least in the Ninth 
Circuit, expansive interpretations of the courts' jurisdictional 
powers will continue into the twenty-first century. 
Originally, the foundation of jurisdictional jurisprudence 
in the United States rested on the premise that no state could 
exercise jurisdiction over a person outside its territorial bor-
ders.3 With the advent of modern industrial society, solely ter-
ritorial based notions of sovereignty and jurisdiction became 
strained and unworkable.4 The concept that a state has con-
trol over everything within its borders and nothing beyond be-
gan to erode.5 As a result, during the twentieth century, the 
1 See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS ch., 2 §§ B, C 
(7th ed. 1997). 
2 See generally Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc., 223 F.3d 1082 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
3 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 
70-71 (3rd ed. 1996). 
4 See generally McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
5 See generally Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (which discussed that notice 
51 
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courts began to shift their focus from a territorial concept of 
jurisdiction to a notice-based concept.6 State courts exercised 
jurisdictional powers beyond their geographical territory so 
long as the party over whom the court sought jurisdiction had 
fair notice that jurisdiction might be asserted.7 The require-
ment that a party have notice refers to both the rules con-
cerning the actual service of process and the Constitutional 
limits imposed by the due process clause.8 It is the latter re-
quirement that is the subject of this note. 
With the development of the Internet, deeply rooted terri-
torial based concepts of jurisdiction have clashed with the no-
tice-based system.9 While courts have moved towards a notice-
based system, generally some tangible link with the forum 
state is found that gives rise to the constitutionally based no-
tice requirement. 1o Within the context of the Internet, courts 
have struggled with how to apply the notice-based system be-
cause Internet contacts occur in cyberspace rather than in a 
particular territory.H If cyber-contacts alone constituted suffi-
serves to put non-residents on equal jurisdictional footing with residents and there-
fore a party need not be actually physically present within the state in order for pro-
cess to be served). See generally Gray v. American Radiator, 176 N.E.2d. 761 (Ill. 
1961). In Gray, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed a district court's grant of a 
motion to squash service of process for lack of personal jurisdiction over an out of 
state defendant alleged to have committed tortious conduct resulting in an injury in 
Illinois. See id at 761. There, the defendant allegedly negligently manufactured a 
valve on a water heater causing injury to the plaintiff in the State of Illinois. See id. 
at 762. See generally Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916). 
6 See Gray,176 N.E.2d. at 765 (discussing McGee, 355 U.S. at 222-224). 
7 See Gray,176 N.E.2d. at 765-767. Corporations are treated similarly to persons 
for purposes of establishing jurisdiction. See Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U.S. 
19, 24 (1930). To say a corporation is present within a state's jurisdiction for the pur-
poses of satisfying the due process requirement is to say a corporation's activities 
within the state satisfy the due process clause. See International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-317 (1945) (discussing Klein, 282 U.S. at 24). 
8 See generally COUND, supra note 1, ch. 2-3. 
9 The Internet has been defined as "a worldwide network of computers that en-
ables various individuals and organizations to share information. The internet allows 
computer users to access millions of web sites and web pages. A web page is a com-
puter data file that can include names, words, messages, pictures, sounds, and links 
to other information." Panavision v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). 
10 See Tech Heads, Inc. v. Desktop Service Center, Inc., 105 F.Supp.2d 1142, 
1148-1149 (D. Or. 2000). See CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260 (6th 
Cir. 1996). See Panauision, 141 F.3d at 1319. 
11 See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-420 (9th Cir. 1997); 
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cient notice to subject a defendant to jurisdiction in a distant 
state, a court's ability to exercise its jurisdictional authority 
beyond its own territory would be greatly expanded. Courts 
have attempted to limit their jurisdictional reach into cyber-
space by distinguishing web sites that passively provide infor-
mation or advertisements from those that facilitate the ex-
change of information or do business over the Internet.12 
The exercise of jurisdiction based on remote contacts is 
not a new concept.13 The United States Supreme Court at-
tempted to expand the notice-based concept of jurisdiction to 
permit the exercise of jurisdiction when geographic or physi-
cal contacts are lacking.14 In Calder v. Jones,15 the Court held 
that jurisdiction was proper over a defendant in a foreign ju-
risdiction who purposefully directed tortious conduct from one 
state to an individual in the forum state.16 This note will dis-
cuss the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Bancroft & Mas-
ters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc,17 which broadly interpreted 
Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1320-1322; Tech Heads, 105 F.Supp.2d at 1147-1149 (D. Or. 
2000). For example, an Internet user in one state may now visit an Internet site of a 
citizen in another state. Cyber space is the on-line world of computer networks. See 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 287 (10th ed. 2000). 
12 See Tech Heads, 105 F.Supp.2d at 1148-1149. For an informative discussion of 
the differences of passive, active, and interactive web sites. See id at 1148-1151. A 
. passive web site generally only furnishes information to those who visit the site, and 
is not a sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 1149-1150. 
See also Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F.Supp. 327, 333 (D.N.J. 1997). Further complicat-
ing matters, a home page or web site on the Internet is not necessarily created by a 
corporate entity but may also be created by an individual. Thus, an individual who 
conducts business over the Internet may now be subjected to the jurisdiction of a fo-
rum state the same way a corporation would be. In Panavision, the court found the 
burden of exercising jurisdiction over the defendant was significant but not determi-
native. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323. While it may not be that burdensome or un-
reasonable for a huge corporate entity to defend itself in an out of state court, it 
seems less fair that one individual could be suddenly subjected to jurisdictional 
claims throughout the country. 
13 See generally Hess, 274 U.S. 352; Gray, 176 N.E.2d. 761. 
14 See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
15 See id. 
16 See id. at 791. 
17 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). The appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California was argued and submitted April 13, 
2000 before Circuit Judges Mary M. Schroeder, Circuit Judge Joseph T. Sneed, and 
Circuit Judge Stephen S. Trott. See id. The decision was filed August 18, 2000. Cir-
cuit Judge Schroeder authored the opinion. See id. Circuit Judge Sneed filed a con-
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tortious conduct in an effort to extend its jurisdictional reach 
on the most intangible contacts. The court's decision stretches 
the definition of forum related activities so far, that it largely 
divests the limitation of any purpose in the context of inten-
tional torts. 
II. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Bancroft & Masters Inc. brought suit against Augusta 
National, Inc. in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California seeking a declaratory judg-
ment for non-dilution18 and non-infringement.19 Bancroft, a 
small California corporation, sold computer and networking 
products, and support services.20 Bancroft conducted nearly all 
of its business in San Francisco, California.21 Bancroft has 
owned and operated the Internet domain name22 "mas-
ters.com" since February 8, 1995.23 Augusta, a Georgia corpo-
ration, operated the Augusta National Golf Club in Georgia.24 
Augusta's club sponsored the annual Masters golf tourna-
curring opinion in which Circuit Judge Trott joined. See id. 
18 The term "dilution" means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to 
identify and distinguish goods and services, regardless of the presence or absence of-
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likeli-
hood of confusion, mistake, or deception. See 15 U.S.C. §1127 (1991 & Supp. V 2000). 
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1991). Bancroft also sought an order canceling Augusta's 
federally registered trademarks. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National, 
Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 777, 779 (N.D. Cal. 1998). Infringement is defined as a violation 
of another's intellectual-property right. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY POCKET EDITION 314 
(1996). 
20 See Bancroft, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 778. 
21 See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1084 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
22 The term "domain name" means any alphanumeric designation, which is regis-
tered with, or assigned by any domain registrar, domain registry, or other domain 
name registration authority as part of an electronic address on the Internet. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1127 (1991 & Supp V 2000). "Every web page his its own web site which is 
its address, similar to a telephone number or street address. Every web site on the 
Internet has an identifier called a "domain name." The domain name often consists of 
a person's name or a company's name or trademark. For example, Pepsi has a. web 
page with a web site consisting of the company name, Pepsi, and .com, the "top level" 
domain designation; Pepsi.com." Panavision v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
23 See Bancroft, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 778. 
24 See id. at 779. 
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ment.25 Augusta owned several federally registered26 trade-
marks27 for the mark "Masters" and operated a web site at 
the domain name "masters.org."28 
In 1997, Augusta sent a letter to Network Solutions Inc., 
(hereinafter, "NSI"), contesting Bancroft's right to use the 
"masters. com" domain name.29 At the time, NSI was the only 
registrar administering domain names in the United States.3D 
Augusta's letter to NSI triggered NSI's dispute resolution pol-
icy for disputes between registered holders of Internet domain 
names and holders of the same or similar registered trade-
mark names.31 According to NSI's policy, Bancroft's domain 
name "masters. com" would be placed on hold unless it filed 
suit against Augusta seeking a declaratory judgment estab-
lishing its right to use the "masters. com" domain name.32 Con-
sequently, Bancroft brought suit against Augusta.33 
The district court dismissed the action for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction because the letter Augusta sent to NSI did 
25 See id. 
26 The term "registered mark" means a mark registered under the Lanham Act 
or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or the Act of 
March 19, 1920. See 15 U.S.C. 1127 (1991). The term "mark" includes any trademark, 
service mark, collective mark, or certification mark. See id. 
27 The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any com-
bination thereof. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1991). 
28 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1084. 
29 See Bancroft, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 779. Augusta also sent a letter to Bancroft in 
California but this fact was not relied by Bancroft at trial and is not pertinent to the 
court's analysis. See id. at 779, 782. 
30 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1084-1085. For an interesting discussion of the evolu-
tion of the domain name system see Image Online Design, Inc. v. Core Association, 
120 F. Supp. 2d 870, 872-875 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
31 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1085. Under the policy Bancroft could (1) transfer 
the "masters. com" domain name to Augusta; (2) allow the domain to be placed on 
hold which would mean that neither party could use it until the dispute was settled; 
or (3) seek a declaratory judgement from a court of competent jurisdiction, establish-
ing its right to the "masters. com" domain name. See id. 
32 See id. A person seeking to have a declaration of her property rights or duties 
may ask for such a declaration and the court may make a binding declaration of her 
rights or duties whether or not further relief is claimed at that time. See CAL. CN. 
PRoe. CODE § 1060 (West Supp. 2000). Had the domain name been placed on hold, 
neither party could have used the domain name during the settlement of the dispute. 
See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1085. 
33 See id. 
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not satisfy the "effects" doctrine"34 under the purposeful avail-
ment prong of the test for specific jurisdiction.35 The court 
also concluded that the contacts with the forum state did not 
give rise to the cause of action because the intellectual prop-
erty dispute did not arise out of Augusta's letter to NSI. 36 
Furthermore, the court stated that it "would be unreasonable 
to require an intellectual property owner to risk having to 
submit to the jurisdiction of an alleged infringer in order to 
exercise his rights."37 Bancroft appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.3s 
III. BACKGROUND 
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States, a state may not 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.39 Judgments affecting the rights and obliga-
tions of a party, over which a court lacks personal jurisdic-
tion, offend a party's due process rights.40 The United States 
34 In tort cases a defendant satisfies the purposeful availment prong if the 
defendant performs the following: (1) an intentional act (2) that is expressly aimed at 
the forum state (3) which causes harm, the brunt of which is suffered in the forum 
state and the defendant knows the harm is likely to be suffered there. See Core-Vent 
Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993). 
35 See Bancroft, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 783. California permits the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over an out of state defendant under CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 415.40 (West Supp. 
2000). 
36 See Bancroft, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 782. 
37 1d. citing Douglas Furniture Co. v. Wood Dimensions, Inc 963 F.Supp. 899, 903 
(C.D. Cal. 1997). 
38 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1085. On appeal Bancroft essentially argued, inter 
alia, that based on Augusta's letter to NSI the district court had a sufficient basis for 
exercising specific jurisdiction over Augusta. See id. 
39 The 14th Amendment states in relevant part; "[nlo State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the Untied 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law . . . " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
40 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). Jurisdiction is defined as: 1) a 
government's general power to exercise authority over all persons and things within 
its territory. 2) A court's power to decide a case or issue a decree. 3) A geographic 
area within which political or judicial authority may be exercised. 4) A political or ju-
dicial subdivision within such an area. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 855 (7th ed. 1999). 
The tribunal before which an action is tried, must be competent by its constitution 
which created its power to render a judgment over the proceeding. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 
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Supreme Court addressed the extent to which a state may ex-
ercise its jurisdictional powers in the seminal case Pennoyer v. 
Neff.41 In Pennoyer, the Court stated that a forum state may 
exercise personal jurisdiction over an absent nonresident 
defendant only if the defendant appeared in the court, was 
found within the state, was a resident thereof, or had prop-
erty therein.42 The Court held that a state court violates due 
process when it enters a judgment against a person without 
jurisdiction over that person.43 
The Pennoyer requirement of actual physical presence 
within the forum state became particularly strained with the 
advent of the automobile.44 Due to automobile accidents in-
at 733. When the subject matter involves the personal liability of a defendant, the 
due process clause requires that the defendant appear before the court or alterna-
tively the court may bring the person of the defendant within its jurisdiction through 
personal service of process. Personal jurisdiction is against the person of the defend-
ant by service of process, whereas in rem jurisdiction is a procedure against property 
located within the jurisdictional territory of the court and does not personally bind 
the defendant beyond the property in question. [d. at 724. This note's discussion is 
limited to personal jurisdiction. 
41 95 U.S. 714. In Pennoyer, plaintiff Neff sought to recover a tract of land in Or-
egon to which defendant Pennoyer claimed title and right of possession. See id. at 
719. The Court determined that the judgment entered in the prior proceeding against 
Neff was invalid from defects in both the affidavit from which the order of publica-
tion was obtained, and in the affidavit by which the publication was proved in that 
proceeding. See id. at 720. The Court affirmed that the judgment was invalid on 
other grounds. See id. at 721-722. 
42 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720 (citing the Code of Oregon's then existing provi-
sion for the service of process on a non-resident, absent defendant with property in 
the state.) See id. The Court found no personal jurisdiction because the defendant 
was not a resident of Oregon, he was not found within the state, and he did not ap-
pear before the court. See id. The Court further stated that when jurisdiction is exer-
cised based on property, jurisdiction was proper only to the extent of such property at 
the time jurisdiction is attached. See id. 
43 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733-734. While a statute provided for jurisdiction over 
out of state defendants with property in the Oregon, the Pennoyer Court invalidated 
the judgment because jurisdiction based on the property had not attached before the 
court entered judgment. See id. at 728. The Code of Oregon declared "that no natural 
person is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of the State, "unless he appear in the 
court, or be found within the State, or be a resident thereof, or have property therein; 
and in the last case, only to the extent of such property at the time the jurisdiction 
attached." [d. at 720. 
44 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354 (1927) (involving a Massachusetts stat-
ute providing for automatic service of process within the state for all out of state mo-
torists). The Court found that by the operation of a motor vehicle in another state, 
7
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volving out of state parties, states enacted "long arm stat-
utes," which allowed state courts to assert personal jurisdic-
tion over out of state defendants.45 The Court recognized the 
public policy served by such statutes and held that such stat-
utes did not offend the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment thereby heralding the beginning of the end of ter-
ritorial based notions of personal jurisdiction.46 Today, many 
state long arm statues simply provide for the exercise of juris-
diction to the fullest extent allowable by the due process 
clause.47 
The Court again addressed the limits on the exercise of 
jurisdiction over foreign defendants imposed by the due pro-
cess clause in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 48 The In-
ternational Shoe Court decided whether the State of Washing-
ton could permissibly exercise jurisdiction over a Delaware 
corporation conducting activities in Washington.49 The Court 
noted that while historically the exercise of jurisdiction over a 
person was based on the actual presence of that person within 
a court's territorial jurisdiction, the focus had shifted to 
whether the defendant had notice that personal jurisdiction 
the driver had given implied consent to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of 
the foreign state for proceedings growing out of accidents or collisions. See id. at 356. 
45 See id. at 354. These statutes provided that the operation of a motor vehicle in 
the state was evidence of the driver's acceptance of rights and responsibilities includ-
ing a designated registrar in the state on whom process could be served. See id. at 
357. 
46 See id. at 356-357. 
47 See Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1996), California's 
long arm statute allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant to 
the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Constitution of the 
United States. See also CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 415.40 (West Supp. 2000). A person 
outside the State of California may be served in any manner under Article 3 Manner 
of Service of Summons or by sending a copy of the summons by first class mail, post-
age prepaid, requiring a return receipt. See also CAL. Crv. PROC. § 410.10 (West Supp. 
2000). Federal courts apply the personal jurisdiction rules of the forum state in which 
they sit in diversity of jurisdiction cases. See Murray Brand v. Menlove Dodge, 796 
F.2d 1070, 1072-1073 (9th Cir. 1986). This note will only address these constitutional 
limits imposed by the due process clause and will not deal with any state's self im-
posed statutory limitations. 
48 See 326 U.S. 310, 311 (1945). 
49 See id. A corporation is a person and while it maybe a fiction, it is a fiction in-
tended to be acted upon as though it were a fact. See Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 
282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930). 
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may be asserted. 50 The Court stated that the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant was proper so long as 
the defendant had "certain minimum contacts with [the fo-
rum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "51 The 
Court clarified that the test is not merely quantitative, but 
depends on the quality and nature of the defendant's contacts 
ties and relations. 52 The Court concluded that systematic and 
continuous contacts resulting in a large amount of business 
with the forum state all of which received the benefits and 
protections of that state were sufficient to justify the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction. 53 
Following International Shoe, the Court assumed the 
terms "general" and "specific" jurisdiction to distinguish the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction in suits that arise out of a 
defendant's contacts with the forum from suits that do not 
50 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
61 See id., citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). Where a person en-
gages in activities, which afford him of the privileges and protections of a state, the 
state may exact reciprocal duties involving the incidences of citizenship. See Interna-
tional Shoe, 326·U.S. at 316. So where the suit involved those activities and extrater-
ritorial service of process was actually accomplished, traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice required by due process are satisfied. See Milliken, 311 U.S. 
at 463. 
62 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. The court stated that when a corpora-
tion has continuous and systematic contacts that give rise to the liabilities sued on 
"presence" within the forum exists. See id. at 317. However, casual presence or iso-
lated activities in the forum state do not satisfy the requirements of due process 
when the suit does not arise out of such activities. See id. 
63 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320. International Shoe was a Delaware 
corporation with its principal place of business is in St. Louis, Missouri. See id. at 
313. It had no offices in the State of Washington. See id. The corporation did not 
make contracts for sale or purchase in the state nor did it maintain stocks of mer-
chandise in Washington. See id. International Shoe's only connection with Washing-
ton was through its approximately thirteen salesmen who resided there. See id. 
These salesmen exhibited their samples to customers in Washington and then trans-
mitted .orders to the corporation's St. Louis office from where they were supervised. 
See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313-314. The salesman had no authority to enter 
into contracts or make collections and all shipments were shipped f.o.b. from out of 
state. See id. at 314. The Court found that the privilege of employing salesman 
within Washington gave rise to the right of the State of Washington to collect a tax 
imposed on the exercise of this privilege. See id. at 320-321. Therefore, International" 
Shoe's contacts should have put it on notice that it may be haled into a Washington 
court regarding those contacts and therefore doing so was not unreasonable under 
the traditional conceptions of fair play and substantial justice. See id. at 321. 
9
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arise out of those contacts. 54 Thus, when a court exercises ju-
risdiction over a foreign defendant in a suit arising out of the 
defendant's contacts with the forum it is commonly referred to 
as "specific" jurisdiction.55 Conversely, when the defendant 
has significant contacts with the forum state, courts will exer-
cise what is commonly referred to as "general" jurisdiction, re-
gardless of whether the suit arises out of the defendant's fo-
rum related activities. 56 
A. GENERAL JURISDICTION 
This note will only briefly discuss general personal juris-
diction because the Ninth Circuit in Bancroft & Masters, Inc. 
u. Augusta National, Inc. focused on specific jurisdiction. The 
United States Supreme Court considered whether sufficient 
contacts existed with the State of Texas to permit the exercise 
of general personal jurisdiction over the defendant in 
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. u. Hall. 57 In 
Helicopteros, the Court concluded that even when the cause of 
action does not arise out of the defendant's forum related ac-
tivities, the exercise of jurisdiction does not violate due pro-
cess so long as the defendant has sufficient contacts with the 
forum state. 58 The Court stated that mere purchases, even if 
occurring at regular intervals, do not constitute sufficient con-
tacts to warrant the exercise of general personal jurisdiction 
54 See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, et ai., 466 U.S. 408, 414 
nn.8-9 (1984), citing Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to adjudicate: A suggested 
Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121, 1136-1164 (1966); Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: 
Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 S. CT. REV. 77; 80-81; and 
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 786 (1984). 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 408. 
58 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414. The Court relied on Perkins v. Benguet Con-
solidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), where the Court considered whether or not 
jurisdiction was proper by an Ohio court over a defendant Philippine mining corpora-
tion. See id. at 438. The corporation had maintained an Office in Ohio, held meetings 
there, maintained records, distributed salary checks and used an Ohio bank as a 
transfer agent during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. See id. at 448. The 
Court found that where continuous and systematic contacts were shown the exercise 
of general jurisdiction over the corporation for unrelated causes of action was permis-
sible. See id. at 448. 
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over a defendant. 59 Therefore, the Court found that the 
defendant's contacts with Texas did not rise to the level of 
continuous and systematic contacts.60 
B. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the criteria 
for finding personal jurisdiction when the suit arises out of a 
defendant's contacts with the forum in Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz.61 In Burger King, the Court discussed whether the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Florida court over a Michigan 
resident in a breach of contract action violated the due pro-
cess clause.62 The Court restated that an individual's liberty 
interest63 is protected by the due process clause if that indi-
vidual has fair warning that his activities will subject him to 
the jurisdictional reach of the forum. 64 The Court applied the 
two-part test set out in International Shoe, requiring a show-
ing of minimum contacts, ties, or relations with the forum 
59 See id at 418. See also Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 
516 (1923). An Oklahoma retail store that sent a buyer on regular trips to New York 
to purchase clothing did not subject buyer to personal jurisdiction in New York. See 
id. But see Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418 n.12 (where the Court clarifies that the con-
tinuing validity of Rosenberg with respect to specific jurisdiction was not decided by 
the Helicopteros Court since this was purely a case involving the exercise of general 
jurisdiction). 
60 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416. Helicopteros' contacts with the state of Texas 
consisted of a contract-negotiating session in Texas attended by its chief executive of-
ficer, acceptance of checks drawn on a Texas bank account, the purchase of helicop-
ters, equipment, training services from a Texas corporation and sending personnel to 
Texas for training. See id. 
61 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
62 See id. at 463. 
63 See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 
694, 702-703 n.10 (1982) (where the Supreme Court rejected in dicta, the notion that 
personal jurisdiction was governed by the federalism concept of restricting states' 
power). Instead it is the individual's liberty interest as preserved by the due process 
clause, which limits a state's power to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. 
See id. While personal jurisdiction embodies an element of federalism it clearly does 
not operate as an independent restriction on the sovereign power of a court because if 
it did it would not be possible for a defendant to waive the personal jurisdiction re-
quirement. See id. 
64 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-472, citing and quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977); See also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
319 n.13 (1945). 
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state and a showing that maintenance of jurisdiction based on 
those contacts, ties, or relations does not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.65 
The Court in Burger King noted that in order to satisfy 
the minimum contacts requirement, the contacts must be 
such that a defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled 
into the forum's courtS.66 The Court stated that a defendant 
could reasonably anticipate being haled into a forum state if 
the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privileges of 
conducting activities in the forum.67 In Burger King, defend-
ant Rudzewicz entered into a twenty-year franchise agree-
ment with the restaurant chain, a Florida corporation with its 
principal place of business in Florida.68 The franchise agree-
ment was Rudzewicz's only significant contact with Florida.69 
65 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. 
68 See id. at 474. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 297 (1980) (where the Supreme Court distinguishes that the forseeability of 
causing injury in another forum is not a sufficient benchmark for exercising personal 
jurisdiction, but rather it is conduct that should make a defendant reasonably antici-
pate being haled into the forum's court). In World-Wide, the plaintiff's had purchased 
an automobile and driven it to another state where they were involved in an acci-
dent. See id. at 288. The Court found that the car was being used as intended after 
its purchase and was therefore in the stream of consumption. See id. at 298-299. This 
aspect distinguishes this case from cases where a defendant puts a product into the 
stream of commerce with the expectation that the product would reach the forum 
state. See id. Thus, the Court concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction by the forum 
state did not satisfy the forseeability of being haled into court requirement of the 
minimum contacts prong. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297-299. 
67 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-475. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 
235, 253 (1958). In Hanson, the Court found that unilateral activities of the plaintiff 
such as the carrying on of bits of trust administration, would not satisfy the mini-
mum contact's requirement where the defendant has not engaged in any purposeful 
acts towards the forum. See id. at 253. The Burger King Court distinguished Hanson 
from McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), where a non-resident 
defendant was haled into a California court. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-476. 
There, the Court found that jurisdiction was proper because the life insurance offer 
was accepted in the State of California and all payments were made from there giv-
ing the contract a substantial connection with the forum. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. 
However, in Hanson, the contract was executed in Delaware by a resident of Penn-
sylvania. See id. at 238. The Burger King Court also noted that in McGee, California 
had a strong interest in providing effective redress to its citizens for an activity 
deemed by a California statute to be exceptional and subject to special regulation. 
See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 483. 
68 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-480. 
69 See id. at 479-480. The Court stated that the purposeful availment require-
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The Court found that Rudzewicz contemplated continuing and 
wide-reaching contacts with Burger King and that the long-
term contract provided Rudzewicz the benefits of affiliation 
with Burger King in Florida. 70 The Court concluded that 
Rudzewicz's purposeful availment of the protection and bene-
fits of the forum state's laws made it reasonably foreseeable 
that he might be haled into a Florida court.71 Thus, the Court 
found that Rudzewicz had purposefully availed himself of the 
benefits and protections of the State of Florida thereby satis-
fying the minimum contacts test.72 
The Burger King Court then considered whether the exer-
cise of specific jurisdiction offended the "fair play and sub-
stantial justice" prong.73 The Court noted that even if suffi-
cient contacts with a forum state existed, the exercise of 
jurisdiction may still offend the due process clause if it would 
be unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over the defendant. 74 
ment was to ensure that a defendant would not be haled into court on the basis of 
random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts with the forum state. See id. at 475. The 
Court remarked that it has never held that a contract with an out of state party 
alone would subject a defendant to a foreign jurisdiction. See id. at 478. The Court 
further stated that in its opinion a contract alone cannot subject a defendant to a for-
eign jurisdiction. See id. 
70 See Burger King, 471 US. at 479-480. The contract was executed in Florida, 
was governed by the laws of Florida and disputes arising out of the contract were to 
be governed by Florida law. See id. at 481. Furthermore, in their course of dealing 
the parties made key negotiations not with the Michigan district office but with the 
Miami office. See id. These included the negotiations that gave rise to the suit. See 
id. at 480-481. The Court stated that factors such' as the contract's negotiation and 
contemplated consequences, as well as its terms and the parties' course of dealing, 
guided the Court in determining whether the defendant had purposefully availed 
himself of contacts with the forum state. See id. at 479. 
71 See Burger King, 471 US. at 482. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. at 476. 
74 See id. at 477-478. There is a presumption of reasonableness upon a showing 
of purposeful direction of activities towards the forum state which the defendant 
bears the burden of overcoming by showing that the exercise of jurisdiction would be 
unreasonable. See Burger King, 471 US. at 477-478. In establishing reasonableness, 
the Court looked to the extent of a defendant's purposeful inteIjection into the forum, 
the burden on the defendant, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, 
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judi-
cial system's interest in the efficient resolution of controversies, the existence of an 
alternative forum and the shared interest of the several states in furthering funda-
mental substantive social policies. See id. at 476-477. Additionally, the Court stated 
that sometimes jurisdiction may be established on a lesser showing of minimum con-
13
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The Court recognized that Florida had a legitimate interest in 
providing an effective means of redress for contractual dis-
putes arising from contracts made in Florida and governed by 
the laws of Florida.75 Furthermore, Rudzewicz was an exper-
ienced businessman who had purposefully entered into an 
agreement with Burger King obligating him to payments of 
over $1 million dollars per year.76 Thus, the Court found that 
Florida's exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable.77 
1. Intentional Torts 
Courts are more permissive in their assertion of jurisdic-
tion over a foreign defendant when the defendant has commit-
ted an intentional tort having an effect within the forum 
state. 78 For example, in Calder v. Jones,79 two Florida re-
sidents, had written, edited, and published an article in the 
National Enquirer, Inc.80 Shirley Jones, a television enter-
tainer and California resident, subsequently filed a libel ac-
tion against them in California.81 The United States Supreme 
Court distinguished untargeted negligence, where jurisdiction 
without more is not proper, from an intentional act expressly 
aimed at a California resident.82 Defendants' knowledge that 
the article would potentially cause injury to Mrs. Jones, the 
brunt of which would be felt in California, and defendants' in-
tacts than necessary if the assertion of jurisdiction would be highly reasonable. See 
id. at 477. 
75 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 483. The contract's choice of law provision, pro-
viding for Florida law to govern all contract disputes, resolved any possibility of con-
flicting substantive social policies. See id at 482. 
76 See id. at 485-487. 
77 See id. at 487. 
78 See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Panavision v. Toeppen, 141 
F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
79 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
80 See id. at 785-786. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. at 789. The Court rejected the defendant's contention that they were 
like welders who had worked on a boiler that explodes in another state and were, 
therefore, not subject to jurisdiction in California. See id. The Court stated that 
under Buckeye Boiler Co, v. Superior Court, 458 P.2d 57 (Cal. 1969) and Gray v. 
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d. 761 (Ill. 1961), jurisdic-
tion over the defendant was not proper because the defendant had engaged in mere 
untargeted negligence and had no control over nor direct benefit from his employer's 
sales in the forum state. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. 
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tentional publication of the article was enough to establish ju-
risdiction over the defendants.83 The Court stated that even 
though the defendants lacked the minimum contacts with 
California normally necessary to assert specific jurisdiction, 
their intentional direction of wrongdoing at a California resi-
dent made the exercise of jurisdiction proper.84 Thus, the 
Court held that intentional conduct calculated to cause injury 
to an individual in California allowed a California court to as-
sert jurisdiction over the defendants.85 
2. The Ninth Circuit Interpretation 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted a 
three-part test for determining whether specific jurisdiction 
may be exercised without violating the Due Process Clause of 
the 14th Amendment.86 In Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,87 
the court addressed whether the maintenance of a home page 
on the world wide web, which. allegedly infringes on the use of 
a service mark, established specific personal jurisdiction over 
the infringer in the service mark holder's principal place of 
business.88 The court stated that in order for jurisdiction to be 
proper, the defendant must; 1) either perform an act or trans-
action with the forum or perform an act by which the defend-
ant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities in the forum;89 2) those activities giving rise to the 
benefits and protections of the forum must also give rise to 
83 See id. at 789-790. 
84 See id.at 788-790. 
85 See id. at 791. No contention was raised arguing the reasonableness of the as-
sertion of jurisdiction. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. 
86 See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. 130 F.3d 414, 416 (1997). See also Voysys 
Corp v. Elk Industries, 1996 WL 119473 (N.D.Cal. 1996) (recognizing the modification 
of the three-part test as stated in Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, 
Inc., 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1977)). 
87 See 130 F.3d at 416. 
88 See id. at 415. 
89 See id. at 416. See also Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). 
This "purposeful availment prong" does not require that the defendant have physical 
contacts with the forum state as long as the defendant's efforts are purposefully di-
rected towards that forum. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 416-417. See also generally 
CompuServe, Inc. V. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Intercon, Inc. v. Bell At-
lantic Internet Solutions, Inc., 205 F.3d 1244 (2000). 
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the cause of action;90 3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be 
reasonable.91 Cybersell presented a question of first impres-
sion in the Ninth Circuit; thus the court looked for guidance 
from the Sixth and Second Circuits.92 
The Sixth Circuit previously addressed whether a Texas 
resident, who had Internet contacts with CompuServe, an 
Ohio corporation, had sufficient contacts to satisfy the re-
quirements of the due process clause in CompuSerue, Inc. u. 
Patterson. 93 In CompuSerue, the defendant transmitted 
software files to CompuServe via the web under an agreement 
governed by Ohio law.94 CompuServe displayed the software to 
its subscribers over the Internet, made sales of the software, 
and transmitted money from the sales to the defendant in 
Texas.95 The Sixth Circuit held that the defendant's act of 
sending software to Ohio indicated that the defendant know-
ingly reached out to purposefully avail himself of the privilege 
of doing business in Ohio.96 Thus, the Sixth Circuit found that 
the Ohio court properly exercised jurisdiction over the 
defendant. 97 
Conversely, the Second Circuit found jurisdiction im-
proper in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. u. King. 98 In Bensusan, 
the New York district court held that the creation of a passive 
web page that potentially infringed on plaintiff's trademark 
90 See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 416. See also Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1498. 
91 See id. 
92 See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 417. 
93 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). 
94 See id. at 1260-1261. 
95 See id. at 1261.' 
96 See id. at 1266-1267. See also Kevin R. Lyn, Personal Jurisdiction and the In-
ternet: Is a Home Page Enough to Satisfy Minimum Contacts?, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
341, 350 (2000). Under the single point presence view taken by some courts the in-
ternet is a physically traveled highway. See id. Presence is determined by residence 
of the defendant or location of the defendant's server and whether the defendant ini-
tiated the contacts with the forum state. See id. 
97 See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1268-1269. 
98 937 F.Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y.1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir.1997). The dis-
trict court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on both due process grounds and on the 
grounds that the exercise of jurisdiction was not allowed under New York's long arm 
statute. See id. The Second Circuit affirmed but did not discuss the due process 
grounds for dismissal. See generally Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 
(2d Cir.1997). Cybersell thus looked to the district court's opinion. See Cybersell,130 
F.3d at 417 n.4. . 
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was not a sufficient contact on which to base jurisdiction.99 
The district court distinguished the defendant's passive web 
page from the defendant's activities in CompuServe. lOO The 
court stated that in CompuServe, the defendant targeted the 
State of Ohio by subscribing to CompuServe's service, enter-
ing an agreement, advertising, and sending software via the 
Internet, all of which benefited the defendant's business. lOl By 
contrast, in Bensusan, the defendant had not purposefully 
availed himself in any way of the benefits of conducting busi-
ness in New York.102 The district court concluded that the 
mere potential for confusion by maintenance of the web site 
did not satisfy the minimum contacts test.103 Consequently, 
the court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. 104 
In Cybersell, the Ninth Circuit found the defendant's ac-
tions more similar to those of the defendant in Bensusan. 105 
The Florida defendant's only contact with the forum state, Ar-
izona, occurred when Arizonans visited his home page over 
the Internet.lo6 The court noted that in each case where 
courts have found jurisdiction proper based on web contacts, 
"something more" must be shown than a mere Internet adver-
99 See Bensusan, 937 F.Supp at 301. In Bensusan, the defendant owned the "Blue 
Note" jazz club in Columbia, Missouri. See id. at 297. The defendant created a web 
page, advertising his club, which allowed browsers to order tickets by using the 
names and addresses of ticket outlets in Columbia. See id. The site also showed a 
phone number whereby browsers could call to order tickets for pickup at the club. See 
id. Plaintiff, the owner of "The Blue Note" trademark and the "Blue Note" club in 
Greenwich Village, sued the defendant for trademark infringement in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See id. at 297-298. 
100 See Bensusan, 937 F.Supp. at 301. See Tech Heads, Inc. v. Desktop Service 
Center, Inc., 105 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1148-1151 (D. Or. 2000) (for an informative discus-
sion of the differences of passive, active, and interactive web sites). A passive web 
site generally only furnishes information to those who visit the site, and is not a suf-
ficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 1149-1150. 
101 See Bensusan, 937 F.Supp at 301. In CompuServe, the defendant sold under 
$650 dollars worth of software to Ohio residents through the CompuServe shareware 
service. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1264-1265 
102 See Bensusan, 937 F.Supp. at 301. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
105 See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 417-418. 
106 See id. at 415. 
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tisement. 107 The court stated that the nature and quality of 
commercial activity conducted over the Internet directly re-
lates to a court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over a defend-
ant. lOS The court held that the defendant's passive homepage, 
which did not seek out or receive any part of its business 
from Arizonans, did not constitute the contacts necessary to 
satisfy the purposeful availment requirement. 109 The court 
further rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendant's 
home page satisfied the effects test for intentional torts be-
cause there was no evidence of intentional aiming at the fo-
rum state.110 Interestingly, the court stated that the effects 
test does not apply with equal force to corporations as it does 
to individuals because corporations do not suffer from harm in 
a particular location as individuals do. m Thus, the court dis-
missed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction.112 
While finding that the effects test was not satisfied in 
Cybersell, the Ninth Circuit elaborated on the effects test in 
Ziegler v. Indian River County.113 In Ziegler, the court noted 
that it applied a different purposeful availment test for tort 
cases than it did for contract cases.114 In tort cases, jurisdic-
tion could attach if the defendant merely engaged in conduct 
aimed at and having an effect in the forum state.115 In Ziegler, 
a California plaintiff, John Ziegler, sued Florida defendants 
for conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights by having 
him arrested for writing a fraudulent check that was valid at 
107 See id. at 418. 
108 See id. at 419, quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 
1119, 1124 (W.D.Pa.1997). 
109 See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420. The court noted that there was no evidence 
that any Arizonan had ever even hit the defendant's web site besides the plaintiff. 
See id. at 419. Furthermore the web page was not aimed intentionally at Arizona. 
See id. at 420. 
110 See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420. 
111 See id., quoting Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 
(9th Cir. 1993). This statement implies that the effects test would be more difficult to 
satisfy if the defendant is a corporation rather than an individual. 
112 See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420. 
113 See 64 F.3d 470, 473-474 (9th Cir. 1995). 
114 See id. at 473. The court rejected the contention that a contract with a resi-
dent of a foreign state is alone sufficient to establish jurisdiction in a breach of con-
tract action and stated that it was consistent with the holding of Burger King. See 
id., citing Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1993). 
115 See id. 
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the time written.U6 The court used a three-part effects test in 
order to satisfy the purposeful availment prong for specific ju-
risdiction. ll7 The three parts are "(1) intentional action; (2) 
aimed at the forum state; and (3) causing harm that the 
defendant should have anticipated would be suffered in the 
forum state."U8 
In Ziegler, the court found that the defendants had com-
mitted an intentional act by obtaining a warrant for Ziegler's 
arrest in Florida, despite their apparent knowledge that no 
crime had been committed.u9 The court deemed these actions 
to be intentional acts expressly aimed at the forum state.120 
The court stated that because the defendants anticipated Zie-
gler's arrest in his home state of California, they had satisfied 
the third part of the effects test. 121 
In Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen,122 the Ninth Circuit 
applied the effects test as stated in Ziegler. 123 The Panavision 
court considered whether the district court properly asserted 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant Toeppen, who had 
committed tortious conduct in cyberspace.124 The court applied 
the same three-part specific jurisdiction test used in Ziegler 
116 See Ziegler, 64 F.3dat 473. 
117 [d. at 474. 
118 [d., citing Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1486. 
119 See Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. Because the effects test was satisfied, so too was the purposeful avail-
ment prong of the three part specific jurisdiction test used by the Ninth Circuit. See 
id. 
122 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
123 See id. at 1321-1322, citing Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 473. 
124 See id. Toeppen had registered Panavision's trademark as his domain name 
through NSI. See id. at 1319. When Panavision attempted to register the Internet do-
main name "Panavision.com" it found Toeppen had already done so. See id. The site 
merely contained a display of photographs of Pana, Illinois. See Panavision, 141 F.3d 
at 1319. Panavision's counsel sent Toeppen a letter in an attempt to get Toeppen to 
stop use of the site. See id. Toeppen responded by a letter which offered to sell the 
"Panavision.com" domain name to Panavision for $13,000, an act often referred to as 
cyber-squatting or cyber-piracy. See id at 1318-1319. Toeppen also promised not to 
register other internet addresses alleged to be Panavision's if Panavision purchased 
the web site. See id. When Panavision refused the defendant's demand, the defendant 
registered Panavision's other trademark "Pananflex", as the domain name 
"Panaflex.com". See id. The defendant's web page for "Panaflex.com" displayed only 
the word "Hello." See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1318. 
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and Cybersell. 125 The court then distinguished Panavision 
from Cybersell. 126 Unlike Cybersell, involving inadvertent 
trademark infringement, the plaintiff in Panavision brought 
an action for intentional trademark dilution. 127 Thus, the 
court stated that jurisdiction may be proper for tort cases if 
the defendant's conduct was aimed at or had an effect in the 
forum state.128 
The Panavision court then applied the effects test under 
the purposeful availment prong of the test for specific jurisdic-
tion. 129 The court found that the defendant, Toeppen, had pur-
posefully engaged in a scheme to register Panavision's trade-
marks.130 Furthermore, Toeppen knew his conduct would 
likely injure Panavision in California, its principal place of 
business. 131 The court stated that physical contacts with the 
125 See id. at 1321-1322. See also Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474. 
126 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321-1322. The Panavision court referred to the 
Cybersell opinion's statement that "something more" is required than a mere Internet 
advertisement to show that a defendant purposefully directed activities towards the 
forum state. See id. (discussing Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 418). 
127 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321. In an action for trademark dilution, the 
owner of a famous mark may only be entitled to injunctive relief unless willful intent 
can be shown. See 15 US.C. § 1125(c) 2 (Supp. 2000). If such willful intent is proven, 
"the owner of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sec-
tions 35 (a) and 36 [15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a), 1118), subject to the discretion of the of the 
court and the principles of equity." [d. But see the Cyberpiracy prevention act 15 
US.C § 1125(d) was not in effect at the time of Panavision. See generally Sporty's 
Farm L.L.C v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2nd Cir. 2000) (discussing the 
application of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act). 
128 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321, citing Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 473. 
129 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322. See also generally Maggos v. Helm, No. 98-
15751, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS 13244 (9th Cir. June 11, 1999) [unpublished opinion] 
(where effects test is found to be satisfied). 
130 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322. Compare generally U-Haul International, 
Inc. v. Osborne, No. CN 98-0366-PHX-RGS, 1999 US. Dist. LEXIS 14466 (D.Az. Feb 
17, 1999) (where the first purposefully directed prong of the effects test was not satis-
fied by defendant's posting of web site that allegedly libeled plaintifi). 
131 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322. See also Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1487 (where 
the court found that the corporate defendant was injured in its principal place of bus-
iness but further stated it was not deciding the issue of where a corporation suffers 
injury because that decision was unnecessary to the out come of the case). Toeppen 
relied on Cybersell, to argue that a large corporation does not suffer injury in one lo-
cation. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322 n.2. The court rejected Toeppen's contention, 
remarking that since Panavision's principal place of business and its state of incorpo-
ration were both in the State of California, the court was not faced with the issue of 
where a corporation suffers injury. See id. citing Core-Vent, 11F.3d at 1487. The court 
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forum state were not necessary so long as activities were pur-
posefully directed toward the forum state.132 Thus, the effects 
test had been satisfied.133 
The Panavision court· then stated that for jurisdiction to 
be proper under the specific jurisdiction test, the claim as-
serted must arise out of the defendant's forum related activi-
ties. 134 Under this prong the court applied a "but for" causa-
tion test. 135 The Panavision court found that this "but for" 
causation was satisfied because but for Toeppen's registration 
of Panavision's trademarks, which was directed towards Cali-
fornia, Panavision would not have suffered injury.13G 
After satisfying the first two prongs of the specific juris-
diction test, the court noted that a plaintiff must still show 
that the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable.137 To es-
tablish reasonableness the court stated that all seven factors 
stated in Burger King138 must be weighed and no one factor 
was dispositive.139 The court determined that that the degree 
likened the harm suffered by Panavision to Indianapolis Colts v. Metropolitan Balti-
more Football Club Ltd. Partnership, 34 F.3d 410, 411-412 (7th Cir. 1994) (where the 
court determined that the Baltimore CFL Colts team was subject to personal jurisdic-
tion in Indiana because the team entered the State of Indiana by broadcasting games 
to Indiana thereby injuring the Indianapolis Colts in Indiana where they primarily 
used their trademarks). See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321-1322. 
132 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1320, citing Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 
(9th Cir. 1995.) The court did not mention the reply letter sent by Toeppen to Panavi-
sion in California, and apparently did not rely on physical contacts. See Panavision, 
141 F.3d at 1316. 
133 See id. at 1322. Compare Tech Heads, Inc. v. Desktop Service Center, Inc., 105 
F.Supp.2d 1142, 1148 (D. Or. 2000) (where the district court found no evidence that 
Desktop intentionally directed its activities at Oregon). Thus, the effects test was not 
met, however the "something more" requirement of Cybersell was met by evidence 
that the web site was interactive rather than passive and the existence of additional 
non-web site contacts with Oregon (Desktop conducted one transaction with a resi-
dent of Oregon). See id. See also Perry v. Righton.Com, 90 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1141 (D. 
Or. 2000) (where the effects test was not satisfied because defendant did not inten-
tionally direct activities at plaintiff in Oregon with the knowledge that the· plaintiff 
would be injured). 
134 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322, citing Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474. 
135 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322. 
136 See id. 
137 See id., citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-477. 
138 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
139 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, citing Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1488. See text 
accompanying note 74. 
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of Toeppen's purposeful interjection was substantial and that 
California's strong interest in providing effective redress did 
not conflict with the sovereignty of Illinois.140 Furthermore, 
the burden on Toeppen in litigating in California did not con-
stitute a depravation of his right to due process, however the 
alternative forum factor did weigh in his favor. 141 In weighing 
these factors the court concluded that, on balance, Toeppen 
had failed to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction 
would be unreasonable. 142 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded the district court properly exercised specific 
jurisdiction. 143 
The Third Circuit similarly interpreted the Calder effects 
test in Imo Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG.144 The plaintiff, Imo, 
alleged that the defendant, Kiekert, had tortiously interfered 
140 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323. Toeppen had registered domain names 
knowing that this action would injure Panavision in California. See id. Furthermore, 
Toeppen sent a letter to Panavision in California demanding money. See id. According 
to the court the state law claims required the same analysis as the federal claims 
and that the federal trademark analysis would be the same in either California or Il-
linois. See id. 
141 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323. The alternative forum factor weighed in the 
Toeppen's favor because California was not the only forum in which the suit could be 
tried. See id. at 1324. As to the burden on the plaintiff of litigating outside of Califor-
nia, the court stated that little weight should be given to this factor. See id. This fac-
tor focuses on evaluating the convenience and effectiveness of relief for the plaintiff, 
which the court stated was given little weight. See id., citing Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 476. 
The court found the burden on Panavision to be slight and thus it weighed in Toep-
pen's favor. See Panavision 141 F.3d at 1324. 
142 See id. at 1323-1324. The efficient resolution factor had little to no impact on 
the reasonableness analysis here because the case involved few witnesses and limited 
evidence. See id. 
143 See id. at 1324. 
144 155 F.3d 254, 260-265 (3d Cir. 1998). In [mo, the court stated that because 
the injury resulted from an alleged intentional tort, the satisfaction of the Calder ef-
fects test would allow the court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. See [mo, 
155 F.3d at 256. The [mo court interpreted the Calder effects test similar to the 
Ninth Circuit. See id. at 265-266. In the Ninth Circuit this test is satisfied by first, 
showing that a defendant committed an intentional act that second, was expressly 
aimed at the forum state, which third, caused harm that was largely felt in the fo-
rum state, which the defendant should have anticipated. See Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 473 
citing Core· Vent, 11 F.3d at 1486. The court required 1) an intentional tort that; 2) 
causes plaintiff to feel the brunt of the harm in the forum state such that it can be 
described as the focal point of the harm; and 3) the defendant must have expressly 
aimed tortious conduct at the forum state so that it can be described as the focal 
point of the tort. See [mo, 155 F.3d at 265-266. 
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with plaintiff's attempt to sell its Italian subsidiary to a 
French corporation.145 The only contact Kiekert had with the 
forum state of New Jersey, consisted of two letters, one sent 
to Italy and the other New York, which were then forwarded 
to Imo in New Jersey.146 In applying the effects test, the court 
declined to follow the Seventh Circuit's broad application of 
the test, and instead recognized that the majority of the cir-
cuits applied the effects test to business torts narrowly.147 The 
Imo court agreed with the conclusions of the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits that the effects test 
145 See id. at 256. Kiekert sent a series of letters to the Italian subsidiary and to 
a New York investment firm representing Imo in the attempted sale, which 
threatened to revoke Kiekert's licensing agreement with the subsidiary. See id. This 
allegedly caused the sale to fall through, resulting in considerable losses. See id. 
146 See id. at 258-260. Additionally, Imo and Kiekert executives conducted busi-
ness meetings in Germany and Canada, and Imo had placed a few phone calls to 
Kiekert in Germany. See Imo, 155 F.3d at 258-260. The court noted that the weight of 
authority among the circuits established that some minimal correspondence alone 
was sufficient to satisfY the minimum contacts requirement for the purposes of spe-
cific jurisdiction. See id. at 259-260 n.3. 
147 See id. at 261-263. The Seventh Circuit stated that the state in which the vic-
tim suffers a tortious injury may exercise personal jurisdiction over the alleged 
tortfeasor. See Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997), citing In-
dianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 411-412. A tort does not occur until an actual injury oc-
curs. See Janmark, 132 F.3d at 1202; but see Berthold Types Limited v. European 
Milkograf Corp., 102 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (where the court distin-
guishes that in Janmark the claim concerned interference with prospective economic 
advantage which did not occur until the customer canceled the order in Illinois). 
However, in the context of trademark violation, the place of sale is deemed where the 
tort occurs not the place of economic harm. See id. Compare Clearclad Coatings, Inc. 
v. Xontal Ltd., No. 98 C 7199, 1999 WL 652030 at *17 (N.D. Ill. 1999), citing 
Janmark, 132 F.3d at 1202 (where the district court found the tort from a trademark 
infringement claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 occurred in Illinois because that is where· 
the injury (bad financial consequences) occurred. The Janmark court reasoned that 
when the plaintiff corporation suffered the loss of a customer that loss occurred in il-
linois, the forum state where the plaintiff's sales operations were based. See 
Janmark, 132 F.3d at 1202. Therefore, a California defendant's phone call to a New 
Jersey customer causing the customer to cancel an order with an Illinois based 
defendant caused an injury in Illinois. See id. at 1202-1203. Thus, jurisdiction was 
proper. See id. The court in Janmark did not address whether the defendant knew 
where plaintiff was located. This knowledge is required for both the "express aiming" 
prong and the "brunt of the harm prong." Imo, 155 F.3d at 264 n.6. The court in Imo, 
stated that while the Janmark court may have assumed that the defendant had 
knowledge of the location of the plaintiff, this was not sufficient to satisfY the knowl-
edge requirement of the expressly aimed prong or the brunt of the harm/focal point of 
the harm prong in the Third Circuit. See id. 
23
Kroblin: Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
74 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1 
requires more than the mere showing that an intentional tort 
was felt within the forum. 148 Furthermore, the court agreed 
with the Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits that the effects test 
may be satisfied only if the plaintiff can point to specific con-
tacts that show the defendant expressly aimed its act at the 
particular state, thereby rendering the forum state the focal 
point149 of the tortious activity.150 The court continued that 
this typically requires some form of entry into the forum 
state.151 The Imo court focused only on the "expressed aiming" 
requirement. 152 The court found that Kiekert, unlike the 
defendant in Cybersell, knew that Imo was located in the fo-
rum state.153 The court stated that this knowledge, while nec-
essary, did not alone satisfy the express aiming prong.154 The 
court determined that the letters revealed that Kiekert fo-
cused its intentions on First Boston in New York and Roltra 
in Italy, not on Imo in the forum state, New Jersey.155 Thus, 
148 See [mo, 155 F.3d at 265. See also Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 
1071, 1077-1078 (10th Cir. 1995) (intentional business tort alone is not enough to sat-
isfy the effects test); Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 772-773 
(5th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff's fortuitous location of its principle place of business within 
the forum without evidence of express aiming or knowledge of the location of the 
brunt of the harm is not enough to support the exercise of jurisdiction); ESAB Group, 
Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 625-626 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 
1048 (1998) (defendant's mere knowledge that conduct would lower plaintiffs sales 
does not satisfy the expressly aimed prong nor does knowledge of plaintiffs principal 
place of business with out more show that the brunt of the harm prong has been 
met); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-420 (9th Cir. 1997) (effects 
test not met where web site was not expressly aimed at nor was knowledge of loca-
tion of brunt of harm shown); General Electric Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 
1376, 1387-1388 (8th Cir. 1993) (effects test not satisfied where the brunt of the 
harm occurs outside of the forum); Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 90-92 (1st 
Cir. 1998) (effects test not satisfied even though effect was felt in forum, where no 
showing of intentional targeting). 
149 The [mo court noted that they did not accept or reject the notion that the ef-
fects of Kiekert's conduct were felt in by the plaintiff in New Jersey because its deci-
sion did not reach this issue. See [mo, 155 F.3d at 265-266 n9. However the court 
mentioned that it was unclear as to whether a corporation could feel the effects of 
tortious conduct in a particular geographic location. See id. 
160 See id. at 265. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. at 266. 
153 See [mo, 155 F.3d at 266. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. at 267. The court looked at whether the letters, phone calls, and meet-
ings constituted sufficient evidence of express aiming. See id. at 266-267. Kiekert did 
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because the defendant did not engage in conduct expressly 
aimed at the forum state, the court did not determine 
whether the brunt of the harm was felt in the forum state.156 
The court concluded that Imo failed to meet the minimum 
contacts requirement of the effects test.157 
3. Cease & Desist Letters 
A debate has developed among the Ninth Circuit district 
courts as to how to treat cease and desist letters for purposes 
of establishing specific jurisdiction.158 At first glance, the dis-
trict courts appear to have a split in opinion as to whether 
"cease and desist" letters alone are sufficient contacts to sat-
isfy the minimum contacts test. 159 A closer inspection reveals 
that the cases are distinguishable. 
The United States District Court for the Central District 
of California, in Douglas Furniture Co. v. Wood Dimensions, 
Inc.,160 addressed whether sending two cease and desist letters 
established sufficient contacts with California. 161 The court 
applied the three-part specific jurisdiction test used in the 
Ninth Circuit162 and found that the exercise of jurisdiction 
not originate any of the phone calls conducted with Imo and, therefore, did not ex-
pressly aim its actions toward New Jersey. See id. at 267. Compare Brainerd v. Gov-
ernors of the University of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1258-1260 (9th Cir. 1990) (uniniti-
ated telephone calls and the response to a letter were sufficient to satisfy the effects 
test). 
156 The Imo court noted that they did not accept or reject the notion that the ef-
fects of Kiekert's conduct were felt in by the plaintiff in New Jersey because its deci-
sion'did not reach this issue. See Imo, 155 F.3d at 265-266 n.9. However the court 
mentioned that it was unclear as to whether a corporation could feel the effects of 
tortious conduct in a particular geographic location. See id. 
157 See id. at 268. 
158 See Wise v. Lindamood, 89 F.Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 (D. Colo. 1999). 
159 See id. 
160 963 F.Supp. 899 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
161 See id. at 900-901. In Douglas Furniture, the defendant Wood Dimensions, 
Inc., an Arizona corporation, sent plaintiff Douglas Furniture, a California corpora-
tion, two cease and desist letters. See id. at 900. The letters alleged that Douglas 
Furniture was marketing a table set that was substantially identical to a table set in 
which Wood Dimensions claimed it had a proprietary right. See id. The letters 
threatened legal action if Douglas Furniture did not immediately cease selling the ta-
ble set. See id. 
162 In the Ninth Circuit this test is satisfied by first, showing that a defendant 
committed an intentional act that second, was expressly aimed at the forum state, 
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was improper under all three prongs,163 The court distin-
guished between letters that had a tortious effect in and of 
themselves, such as letters containing defamatory statements, 
and letters, the contents of which, do not constitute an action-
able injury.l64 Since Wood Dimensions' cease and desist letters 
complained about the tortious conduct of Douglas Furniture, 
and were not tortious in and of themselves, the court deter-
mined that the standard set for the commercial context ap-
plied.165 In the commercial context, the use of the mail or the 
telephone does not constitute purposeful activity invoking the 
protections and benefits of the forum state.166 Thus, the court 
found that the purposeful availment prong had not been satis-
fied. 167 The court continued that even if the letters constituted 
purposeful availment, they did not satisfy the second prong of 
the specific jurisdiction test, which requires that the claim 
arise out of the forum-related contacts.168 The court noted that 
the only connection between the letters and the cause of ac-
tion was that they may have motivated Douglas Furniture to 
file suit, but that this was insufficient to meet the require-
ments of the "arising out of" prong.169 Finally, the court stated 
that it would be unreasonable to require an intellectual prop-
erty owner to face suit in a foreign forum based on a letter at-
tempting to protect intellectual property rights. 170 
The United States District Court for the Central District 
of California in Meade Instruments Corp. v. Reddwarf 
Starware, LLCl7l subsequently criticized the Douglas Furni-
which third, caused harm that was largely felt in the forum state, which the defend-
ant should have anticipated. See Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473-474 
(9th Cir. 1995) citing Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th 
Cir. 1993). 
163 See Douglas Furniture, 963 F.Supp. at 901-903. 
164 See id. at 902 n.1. 
165 See id. at 902. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
168 See Douglas Furniture, 963 F.Supp. at 902-903. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. at 903. The court found that even considering Burger King's require-
ment that the defendant affirmatively show the unreasonablity of a court's assertion 
of jurisdiction it would on its face be unfair to impose such a burden on an intellec-
tual property holder. See id. Consequently, the court dismissed for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. See id. 
171 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1157, 1158 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
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ture decision. In Meade, the defendant Reddwarf, sent one 
cease and desist letter to plaintiff Meade and one to a cus-
tomer of Meade's both of which were located in California.172 
The court disagreed with Douglas Furniture's holding that 
cease and desist letters with nothing more do not constitute 
sufficient contacts to satisfy the minimum contacts require-
ment of the specific jurisdiction test. l73 The court stated that 
the Douglas Furniture holding inconsistently applied the cur-
rent jurisdictional trend in light of the holding in Panavi-
sion. 174 The court reiterated Panavision's holding that the 
"something more" requirement of Cybersell was satisfied by a 
subjective intent to do harm by performing an act, the effect 
of which is felt in the forum state.175 Thus, the Meade court 
applied the effects test as stated in the Ninth Circuit.176 The 
court found that Reddwarf's cease and desist letters that de-
manded that Meade discontinue the use of an invention 
claimed by a United States patent or face the legal conse-
quences had a chilling effect on Meade's business.177 This chil-
ling effect, intentionally directed by the defendant towards 
California, resulted from the sending of the cease and desist 
letters.178 The court found the exercise of jurisdiction over 
Reddwarf was reasonable because Reddwarf, by threatening a 
lawsuit, had notice that a California court might exercise ju-
risdiction over it based on its threats.179 Therefore, the Meade 
court concluded that the mailing of two cease and desist let-
ters to California satisfied the specific jurisdiction minimum 
contacts test,180 
The United States District Court for the District of Colo-
rado recently criticized the Meade decision in Wise v. 
Lindamood. 181 In Wise, defendants Patricia Lindamood, a resi-
dent of California, and Lindamood-Bell, a California corpora-
tion, (hereinafter, "Lindamood"), engaged in communications 
172 See id at 1158 n.4. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. at 1158 n.2. 
175 See id. 
176 See Meade, 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1157-1159. 
177 See id. at 1158 n.4. 
178 See id. at 1158 n.3. 
179 See id. at 1159. 
180 See id. 
181 89 F.Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 (D.Coio. 1999). 
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with plaintiffs Barbara Wise and Remedies for Reading Disa-
bilities, Inc. a Colorado resident and corporation respectively, 
(hereinafter, "Wise").182 In the course of this communication 
Lindamood sent Wise two cease and desist letters.183 The Wise 
court stated that the touchstone inquiry was whether the 
defendant had purposefully directed activities, which the suit 
arises out of and whether the exercise of jurisdiction is rea-
sonable. l84 The court cited Douglas Furniture for the proposi-
tion that the suit resulted from the alleged tortious conduct of 
Lindamood and did not result or arise from the cease and de-
sist letters.185 The court stated that the exercise of jurisdiction 
based on two cease and desist letters would allow the unilat-
eral activity of one party or third person to subject another to 
the jurisdictional reach of the forum state in contradiction of 
the fair play and substantial justice requirement of Burger 
King. 186 The court recognized that a split in authority existed 
as to whether a cease and desist letter constituted sufficient 
contacts to support the exercise of jurisdiction.187 The court 
concluded that the courts that had taken what it deemed to 
be the minority position, that jurisdiction was proper based on 
multiple cease and desist letters, were in tension with the 
precedent from their respective circuits.188 Therefore, the Wise 
182 See id. at 1188-1189. Lindamood believed that Wise was infringing on copy-
right and trademark rights to developmental programs authored by Patricia 
Lindamood and her late husband. See id. 
183 See id. at 1189. Wise filed suit seeking declaratory judgment of non-
infringement in a United States District Court for the District of Colorado. See id. 
184 See Wise, 89 F.Supp. 2d at 1190. The court found that the letters were insuffi-
cient to permit the exercise of jurisdiction. See id. at 119l. 
185 See id. citing Douglas Furniture, 963 F.Supp. at 902. 
186 See id. See also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476, quoting International Shoe, 326 
U.S. at 320. 
187 See Wise, 89 F.Supp. 2d at 1192. 
188 See id. For decisions rendering personal jurisdiction proper on the basis of 
multiple cease and desist letters see generally Meade, 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1157; Bounty-
Full Entertainment, Inc. v. Forever Blue Entertainment Group, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 950 
(S.D. Tex. 1996); Burbank Aeronautical Corp. II v. Aeronautical Development Corp., 
16 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1069 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Tandem Computers Inc. v. Yuter, No. C 
89-20646 RFP, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18384 (N.D. Cal. 1989). For personal jurisdic-
tion based on multiple phone calls, letters, or facsimiles, see generally Oki America, 
Inc. v. Tsakanikas, No. C 93-20728, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19475 (N.D. Cal. 1993); 
Edwards v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 716 F.Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1989). One court de-
termined that a single cease and desist letter satisfied the minimum contacts test, 
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court chose to follow what it claimed to be the majority posi-
tion, that a cease and desist letter alone is not sufficient to 
support the exercise of jurisdiction. 189 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
In Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National, Inc., 190 
the Ninth Circuit considered whether California properly as-
serted personal jurisdiction over Augusta.191 The court stated 
that because California allows the exercise of personal juris-
diction under its long arm statute to the fullest extent permit-
ted by due process, the determination of whether jurisdiction 
is proper must be confined to constitutional limitations.192 
see generally Doleo Packaging Corp. v. Creative Industries, Inc., 1 u.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 
1586 (C.D. Cal. 1986). For circuit .courts that are in tension with district courts that 
have found personal jurisdiction to exist based on cease and desist letters See Ham v. 
La Cienega Music Company, 4 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 1993); Peterson V. Kennedy, 
771 F.2d 1244, 1261-1262 (9th Cir. 1985). 
189 See Wise, 89 F.Supp. 2d at 1192. For courts determining that they lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction see generally Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 
F.3d 1355, 1360-1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Med-Tec, Inc. v. Kostich, 980 F.Supp. 1315, 
1329 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Stairmaster SportslMedical Products, Inc. v. Pacific Fitness 
Corp., 916 F.Supp. 1049 (W.D. Wash. 1994); Zumbro, Inc. v. California Natural Prods., 
861 F.Supp. 773, 781 (D.Minn. 1994); Database America, Inc. v. Bellsouth Advertising 
and Publishing Corp., 825 F.Supp. 1195, 1213 (D.N.J. 1993); BIB Mfg. Co. v. Dover 
Mfg. Co., 804 F.Supp. 1129, 1132-1133 (E.D. Mo. 1992); KVH Industries, Inc. v. 
Moore, 789 F.Supp. 69 (D. R.1. 1992). 
190 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). 
191 See id. at 1084. The court disagreed with Augusta's threshold arguments that 
the appeal was moot due to a settlement offer and a change in NSI's dispute resolu-
tion policy. See id. at 1085. Augusta had offered to waive all trademark infringement, 
dilution, and unfair competition claims if Bancroft agreed to stay out of the golf busi-
ness. See id. The Ninth Circuit stated that the appeal was not rendered moot because 
the promise was qualified and secondly the agreement, if made, would not have 
mooted Bancroft's request that Augusta's "Masters" trademarks be cancelled. See id. 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Augusta's assertion raised at oral argument that the 
appeal was moot because NSI's dispute resolution procedures had changed. See Ban-
croft, 223 F.3d at 1085. Since, this argument was not developed on appeal and unsup-
ported in the record the Ninth Circuit stated it was unable to evaluate the merits of 
the argument. See id. The Ninth Circuit stated that where no evidentiary hearing is 
held by the district court, Augusta's assertion that there were insufficient facts is ir-
relevant because on appeal the court will presume the facts set forth in the pleadings 
and supporting declarations can be proven. See id. 
192 See id. at 1086. See also Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
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A. GENERAL JURISDICTION 
The Ninth Circuit initially distinguished general personal 
jurisdiction from specific personal jurisdiction.193 The Ninth 
Circuit recognized that the United States Supreme Court has 
held that a defendant, who has "substantial" or "continuous 
and systematic" contacts with the forum state, may be haled 
into court in the forum state regardless of the contacts' rela~ 
tion to the suit. 194 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial 
court's determinations that Augusta's contacts with California 
did not amount to substantial or continuous and systematic 
contacts.195 The Ninth Circuit described Augusta's web site. as 
"passive,"196 meaning that consumers could not use it to make 
purchases or to exchange information.197 Finally, the court de-
termined that occasional unsolicited sales of tournament tick-
ets and merchandise to residents of California did not suffice 
to meet the general jurisdiction standard. 19B Therefore, the 
court concluded that Augusta's contacts were not sufficient to 
establish general jurisdiction. 199 
193 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086. 
194 See id. citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 
415 (1984). The Ninth Circuit considered the following factors in determining if the 
defendant's contacts are sufficient to support general personal jurisdiction; whether 
the defendant:· 1) makes sales, solicits or engages in business in the forum state or 
serves its markets; 2) has a designated agent for service of process; 3) is licensed or 
incorporated in the forum. See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086, citing Hirsch v. Blue 
Cross, Blue Shield of Kansas City, 800 F.2d 1474, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986). 
195 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086. The standard for establishing general jurisdic-
tion is "fairly high." See Brand v. Menlove Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 1986). 
The court noted Augusta had no bank accounts in California, was not licensed or reg-
istered to do business in California, and did not pay taxes in California. See Bancroft, 
223 F.3d at 1086. Additionally, Augusta did not target print, television, or radio ad-
vertising toward California. See id. 
196 A passive web site generally only furnishes information to those who visit the 
site, and is not a sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Tech 
Heads, Inc. v. Desktop Service Center, Inc., 105 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1149-1150 (D. Or. 
2000). 
197 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086. 
198 See id. The court distinguished between Augusta's license agreements with 
two television networks and a few vendors in California as doing business with Cali-
fornia not in California. See id. 
199 See id. 
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B. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION 
The Ninth Circuit next analyzed whether the trial court 
had specific personal jurisdiction over Augusta on the basis 
that the case arose out of Augusta's forum related acts.200 The 
Ninth Circuit stated that specific jurisdiction exists if the 
defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privileges of 
the forum state.201 Additionally, the claim must have arisen 
out of the defendant's forum related activities and lastly, the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant must be 
reasonable.202 
1. Purposeful Availment 
The first prong of the specific jurisdiction test requires 
that the defendant purposefully avail him or herself of the 
privileges of the forum state.203 In addressing the first prong, 
the Ninth Circuit focused on Augusta's letter to NSI in Vir-
ginia.204 The letter, which contested Bancroft's right to use the 
"masters. com" domain name, triggered NSI's dispute resolu-
tion policy forcing Bancroft to bring suit or lose control of its 
web site.205 The Ninth Circuit conducted a prima facie juris-
dictional analysis and was, therefore, required to accept Ban-
croft's factual allegations as true.206 Bancroft alleged that the 
letter sent by Augusta to NSI in Virginia intended to affect 
Bancroft in California and thereby satisfied the effects test.207 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that in order for the Calder ef-
fects test to be satisfied there must have been an: 1) inten-
tional act; 2) expressly aimed at the forum state; 3) causing 
harm that the defendant knows the brunt of which will be felt 
in the forum state.208 
200 See id. 
201 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086. See also Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 130 
F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997). 
202 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086. 
203 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086, citing Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 416. 
204 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087. 
205 See id. 
206 See id. 
201 See id. 
208 See id. See also Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321. 
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Applying the effects test, the Ninth Circuit summarily 
concluded that Augusta's letter to NSI was an intentional act 
because Augusta acted intentionally when it sent the letter.209 
In addition the court found that the letter sent to NSI in Vir-
ginia satisfied the third "brunt of the harm" requirement of 
the effects test. 210 The court stated that since the effect of the 
intentional act was to cause harm, the brunt of which was felt 
in California and Augusta knew the harm would be felt in 
California, the third requirement had been satisfied.211 
Regarding the express aiming requirement, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that the effects test would not be satisfied by a 
mere foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state.212 
Rather, the plaintiff must show "something more."213 The 
court stated that "express aiming" at the forum is the "some-
thing more" discussed but not spelled out in prior cases.214 
The court then stated that the express aiming requirement is 
satisfied if the defendant targeted wrongful conduct at an in-
dividual whom the defendant knew to be a resident of the fo-
rum state.215 The court asserted that individualized targeting 
of wrongful conduct stood as the distinguishing fact in deter-
mining whether the effects test could be satisfied.216 
The Ninth Circuit illustrated the individualized targeting 
requirement by contrasting Calder with Cybersell v. Cyber-
sell.217 The court noted that in Calder, the defendants' knowl-
edge that the article would potentially cause an injury, the 
brunt of which would be felt in California and its intentional 
publication sufficed to establish jurisdiction over the defend-
21)9 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088. 
210 See id. 
211 See id. 
212 See id. at 1087. 
213 See id. citing Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322. 
214 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087. See also Panavision, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322; 
Cybersell, 130 F.3d 414, 418. 
215 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087-1088. 
216 See id. at 1088. See also Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Neaves, 912 F.2d 
1062, 1065-1066 (9th Cir. 1990); Brainerd V. Governors of the University of Alberta, 
873 F.2d 1257, 1259-1260 (9th Cir. 1989); Gordy V. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 833 
(9th Cir. 1996); Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1422-1423 (9th Cir. 1987); Haisten v. 
Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986). 
217 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088. 
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ants.218 Since the article in Calder, was written about Shirley 
Jones, a well-known Californian, the writer clearly knew that 
she would suffer the brunt of the harm in California.219 How-
ever, in Cybersell, the court determined jurisdiction was not 
proper because no evidence indicated that the defendants 
knew of the existence of the plaintiffs and individually 
targeted wrongful conduct at them.220 In Cybersell, the defend-
ant allegedly infringed on a service mark held by an Arizona 
corporation by merely maintaining a home page on the World 
Wide Web that was accessible to Arizonans. 221 Thus, the 
Cybersell court concluded that the defendant did not individu-
ally target the plaintiff.222 
In analyzing the letter sent by Augusta to NSI, the Ninth 
Circuit found that Augusta's letter more closely resembled the 
expressly aimed actions described in Calder.223 Similar to Cal-
der, the court found that the letter individually targeted Ban-
croft in California where Bancroft was doing business almost 
exclusively.224 Additionally, the court likened Bancroft to 
Panavision in which the defendant, Toeppen, had deliberately 
chosen to register the plaintiff Panavision's trademarks in or~ 
der to extort compensation.225 In Panavision, Toeppen individ-
ually targeted Panavision's web site, knowing that Panavision 
had trademark rights to the web site's name.226 Furthermore, 
Panavision's principal place of business was in the forum 
state, California.227 The Panavision court, therefore, concluded 
that the express aiming requirement was satisfied by Toep-
pen's "scheme" to register trademarks in order to extort 
money from Panavision.228 The Ninth Circuit analogized that, 
like Toeppen, Augusta knew Bancroft held the "masters. com" 
web site, which would be affected if the NSI dispute resolu-
218 See id. at 1087. See also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-790 (1984). 
219 See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-790. 
220 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088, citing Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 130 F.3d 
414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997). 
221 See Cybersell Inc, 130 F.3d at 415. 
222 See id. at 419-420. 
223 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088. 
224 See id. 
226 See id. See also Panauision, 141 F.3d at 132l. 
226 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d a 1088, citing Panauision, 141 F.3d at 132l. 
227 See Panauision, 141 F.3d at 132l. 
228 See id. 1321-1322. 
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tion policy were triggered.229 Thus, Augusta's letter to NSI in-
dividually targeted Bancroft in the forum state of California 
thereby satisfying the express aiming requirement.23o 
Since writing and sending the letter was an intentional 
act, targeting Bancroft in California, and Augusta knew that 
the brunt of the harm would be felt in California, the effects 
test had been satisfied.231 Therefore, having satisfied the ef-
fects test, the Ninth Circuit determined that the purposeful 
availment prong for specific jurisdiction had been met.232 
2. Contacts Gave. Rise To The Suit. 
The Ninth Circuit looked to whether Augusta's contacts, 
which gave rise to its purposeful availment of the California 
forum, also gave rise to the current suit.233 Utilizing a "but 
for" causation analysis,234 the court stated that but for the let-
ter that Augusta sent to NSI, triggering the dispute resolu-
tion policy, Bancroft would not have been forced to bring suit 
against Augusta.235 Therefore, the court concluded that .the 
second prong of specific jurisdiction had been met.236 
3. Reasonableness Of Exercising Specific Jurisdiction 
The Ninth Circuit also disagreed with the district court's 
finding that California's exercise of jurisdiction was unreason-
able, because the defendant did not present a compelling case 
regarding the seven reasonableness factors.237 If a defendant 
229 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088. Although the court did not say so, one may as-
sume that because Bancroft conducted almost all of its business in California, Au-
gusta knew or should have known that California was the forum where the tortious 
harm would occur. 
230 See id. 
231 See id. 
232 See id. 
233 See id. 
234 See Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1995). 
235 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088. 
236 See id. 
237 See id. at 1088-1089. The court stated that a general denial of reasonable-
ness, supported by questionable precedent is not enough to defeat Burger King's re-
quirement that the defendant present a compelling case regarding the seven reasona-
bleness factors. See id., citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-477 
(1985). 
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has purposefully directed his activities towards the forum 
state, the defendant must present a compelling case that 
other considerations would render the exercise of jurisdiction 
unreasonable.238 The Ninth Circuit distinguished those cases 
based solely on cease and desist letters, where jurisdiction 
has been found unreasonable, from Augusta's letter to NSI. 239 
The court stated that the letter did more than warn or 
threaten Bancroft because under NSI's dispute resolution pol-
icy the letter operated to automatically place Bancroft's web 
site on hold unless Bancroft filed suit.240 The court concluded 
that the district court erred in finding jurisdiction unreasona-
ble, because Augusta had failed to demonstrate a specific rea-
son why the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.241 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order and 
remanded for further proceedings.242 
C. CONCURRING OPINION 
Judge Sneed, joined by Judge Trott, concurred in the 
opinion only on the grounds that on remand it could be shown 
that Augusta intended to engage in tortious conduct.243 Judge 
Sneed stated that had Augusta acted in good faith to protect 
its trademark, rather than in an effort to effect a conversion 
of the domain name, California's exercise of jurisdiction was 
ripe for challenge.244 
v. CRITIQUE 
A. THE EFFECTS TEST: KNOWLEDGE BUT NOT INTENT 
In Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc, the 
Ninth Circuit determined that Augusta had committed an in-
tentional tort by sending a letter to NSI.245 The court rea-
soned that the letter's triggering of the dispute resolution pol-· 
238 See Bancroft 223 F.3d at 1088 citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-477. 
239 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1089. 
240 See id. 
241 See id. 
242 See id. 
243 See id. 
244 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1089. 
245 See id. at 1088. 
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icy, which threatened Bancroft's use of its web site, was 
sufficient to establish that the act was tortious.246 Had NSI's 
dispute resolution policy not required that Bancroft's web site 
be placed on hold, the court would probably not have deemed 
Augusta's actions as tortious. The concurrence supported the 
exercise of jurisdiction on the assumption that Augusta "en-
gaged in tortious conduct, i.e., that they intended to effect a 
conversion of the <masters. com> domain name."247 While the 
concurring opinion states that jurisdiction depends on 
whether a tortious act was committed, the example used sug-
gests that the crucial inquiry was whether the tort had been 
committed intentionally. Thus, the concurrence concluded that 
the exercise of jurisdiction turned on whether Augusta's letter 
to NSI constituted an intentional tortious act.248 
The negative implications of the concurring opinion sug-
gests that the majority held that jurisdiction would be proper 
even if Augusta was merely seeking to protect its trademark. 
Thus, according to the majority opinion the mere fact that 
Augusta's letter had a tortious effect, that Augusta knew was 
likely to occur, established jurisdiction under the effects 
test. 249 The fact that two judges concurred, stating that juris-
diction might not be proper if Augusta was merely seeking to 
protect its trademark from dilution, implies that knowledge 
without intent would not permit the exercise of jurisdiction 
under the concurring opinion. 
The disagreement between the majority and concurring 
opinions seems to be over whether the defendant needs to 
have only knowledge that a tortious effect is likely to occur, or 
whether the defendant needs to have intended the tortious ef-
fect to occur. The majority's opinion supports the former pro-
position. This seems correct under the Ninth Circuit's effects 
test, because the intentional act prong is analyzed separately 
from the prong requiring knowledge of the tortious effect.25o 
246 See id. 
247 See id. at 1089. 
248 See id. 
249 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087-1088. 
250 The separation of the knowledge and intent prongs would not pose such a 
problem if the intent requirement was analyzed by using the three elements of intent 
described by the Restatement. The Restatement requires "a state of mind (2) about 
consequences of an act (or omission) and not about the act ifself, and (3) it extends 
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The separation of these prongs led to an unfair result in this 
case and suggests that the concurring opinion offers the wiser 
course.251 The result of the majority opinion seems unfair be-
cause while Bancroft had agreed to NSI's dispute resolution 
procedure concerning the "masters. com" domain name, Au-
gusta had not. Subjecting a defendant to personal jurisdiction 
in the forum state on the basis of contractual relations be-
tween the plaintiff and a third party is unjust. 252 
B. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION WITHOUT FORUM RELATED ACTIVITIES 
Assuming that the effects test was satisfied, the Ninth 
Circuit in Bancroft, allowed the assertion of specific jurisdic-
tion on what appears to be the lowest threshold of forum re-
lated activities or contacts allowed to date. In Calder v. 
Jones,253 the slanderous article was published in a national 
magazine sold in the State of California. In Ziegler v. Indian 
River County,254 the defendants improperly obtained a Florida 
arrest warrant which they then used to effectuate Ziegler's ar-
rest in California.255 In Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen,256 the 
defendant sent letters to California demanding payment and 
not only to having in the mind a purpose (or desire) to bring about given conse-
quences but also to having in mind a belief (or knowledge) that given consequences 
are substantially certain to result from the act." PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF 
TORTS 34 (w. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (emphasis and footnotes omitted). 
The Bancroft court merely stated that Augusta acted intentionally when it sent its 
letter to NSI. See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088. 
251 In Calder, this distinction is difficult because while the defendant's intended 
to libel the plaintiff, it was not shown that they intended the tortious effect of their 
libel. Rather, the intent of their article was to attract readers. Thus, a requirement 
that the defendant intended the tortious effect may conflict with the holding of 
Calder. 
252 Under the reasoning of Bancroft, a plaintiff's contractual relations with a 
third party allowed for the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant. This is unfair 
because generally the court focuses on the defendant's forum related conduct in de-
termining whether jurisdiction may be asserted. When a court exercises jurisdiction 
beyond its territory the due process inquiry is whether the defendant's acts have 
given rise to notice that jurisdiction might be asserted. See Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-475 (1985). 
253 See 465 U.S. 783, 789-790 (1984). 
254 64 F.3d 470 (9th Cir. 1995). 
255 See id. at 474. 
256 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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threatening Panavision with future tortious conduct.257 In 
Meade Instruments Corp. v. Reddwarf Starware, LLC.,258 the 
defendant sent a cease and desist letter to a California cus-
tomer of Meade's, which caused harm to Meade in Califor-
nia.259 Thus, while in all these cases the defendant's contacts 
with California were highly attenuated, in each case the 
defendant acted in a manner that established a contact, tie, 
or relationship within the forum state of California. The 
Ninth Circuit in Bancroft required no such entry into the fo-
rum, or forum related activity. Augusta in Georgia sent its 
letter to NSI in Virginia. Augusta had no contractual rela-
tions with NSI concerning its trademark rights for the name 
"masters." The court merely stated that the "contacts consti-
tuting purposeful availment must be the ones that give rise to 
the current suit."260 It appears the court considered either Au-
gusta's letter to NSI or the letter's effect in California as the 
contact constituting purposeful availment.261 
If the court used the effect of Augusta's letter as the basis 
for satisfying the requirement that the suit arose out of forum 
related activities; the requirement is pointless because anyone 
injured by an intentional tort could automatically bring suit 
in whatever forum they felt the effect.262 Specific jurisdiction 
requires that the suit arose out of forum related activities, 
but under Bancroft, the effects test is used to satisfy the re-
quirement.263 The effects test does not, however, require there 
to be forum related activity.264 Therefore, using the effects test 
to satisfy the requirement that the suit arose out of forum re-
257 See id. at 1318-1319. 
258 47 U.S.P.Q 2d. 1157 (C.D.Cal. 1998). 
259 See id. at 1157-1159. 
260 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088. 
261 If the court relied on the letter alone (and not its effect), it is a stretch to 
paint the letter a forum related activity. 
262 Of course, the effects test would first have to be satisfied and jurisdiction 
would have to be reasonable. 
263 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088. 
284 The express aiming prong of the effects test is satisfied when the defendant 
engages in tortious conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a 
resident of the forum state. See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087. Such conduct is not how-
ever always forum related where it is possible to injure the plaintiff in some foreign 
state. If such conduct did establish a relationElhip with the forum, it is unclear what 
that the relationship consists of other than a tortious effect. 
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lated activities is illogical. A clearer test might state that in 
order for a court to assert jurisdiction over an out of state 
defendant for an intentional tort, the effects test must be sat-
isfied and jurisdiction must be reasonable. This removes the 
requirement that the suit arose out of forum related activity 
and thus separates the test from the specific jurisdiction anal-
ysis. Since the Ninth Circuit does not appear to be requiring 
forum related activities anyway, clarification of the test would 
be appropriate.265 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Bancroft decision adds to the debate among the dis-
trict courts in the Ninth Circuit as to whether a cease and de-
sist letter alone constitutes sufficient contacts for the asser-
tion of jurisdiction over a defendant. The language used by 
the Meade and Wise courts indicates disagreement on the is-
sue.266 However, the reasoning of Bancroft supports the con-
clusion that the cases are not in conflict and are in fact dis-
tinguishable.267 The question is not whether a cease and 
desist letter creates a sufficient basis for the exercise of juris-
265 See Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, No. 99-15873, No. 99-15902, 2001 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 1539, at *14 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 2001) (where the test used is whether defend-
ant's conduct outside of the forum caused plaintiff to suffer harm in the forum). In 
Myers, the Utah defendant's contacts with National Data Research in Arizona, had a 
tortious effect in Nevada. See id.; see also Report & Recommendation of U.S. Mag. J. 
at 6, Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, DC No. CV-S-98-01179-DWH-(RHL). The District 
Court for the District of Nevada dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, appar-
ently relying on the recommendation of the U.S. Magistrate Judge, that a foreign act 
causing plaintiff injury does not give rise to jurisdiction in the forum state of Nevada 
based on the mere fortuitous fact that plaintiff's reside in Nevada. See Report & Rec-
ommendation of U.S. Mag. J. at 6, Myers, DC No. CV-S-98-01179-DWH-(RHL); Myers, 
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1539, at *1. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the 
defendant's communication from Utah to Arizona was sufficient to permit the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction in Nevada based on the effects of those acts. See Myers, 
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1539, at *17. The Ninth Circuit used the novel term "local con-
duct" to describe the basis on which the claim arose. See id. at *14. The court did not 
clarify on what authority it relied for determining that local conduct could satisfy the 
second prong of its personal jurisdiction analysis, which it merely described as causa-
tion. See id. 
266 See Meade Instruments Corp. v. Reddwarf Starware LLC., 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d 
1157, 1158 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Wise v. Lindamood, 89 F.Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 
(D. Colo. 1999). 
267 See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087-1088. 
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diction, but rather whether the letter in and of itself has an 
intentional tortious effect. The Bancroft court found that a 
tortious effect resulted from Augusta's intentional act and 
that the application of the effects test was appropriate.268 This 
reasoning, therefore, distinguishes Meade, in which the court 
found a tortious effect from Douglas Furniture and Wise, in 
which no tortious effect was found. 269 
As the use of the Internet grows more cases will involve 
only the most remote cyber contacts. The Bancroft facts could 
have easily revolved around an e-mail as opposed to a letter. 
Bancroft suggests that for cases involving remote contacts, 
the crucial jurisdictional inquiry is whether the contacts have 
a tortious effect. The Bancroft court's determination that Au-
gusta's letter constituted an intentional tort is questionable 
and clearly two concurring judges had some reservations. 
However, it is apparent that the exercise of jurisdiction 
turned on this determination. Furthermore, the Bancroft 
court indicated that the lack of forum related activities for an 
intentional tort does not bar the assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion over an out of state defendant.27o Thus, it is evident that 
the Ninth Circuit is leading the expansive jurisdictional trend 
of the twentieth century into the twenty-first century. 
Christopher Allen Kroblin* 
268 In Bancroft, no actual adverse effect to Bancroft's business was shown. Rather 
the eminent threat that Bancroft's web site would be placed on hold was enough to 
permit the use of the effects test. See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087. 
269 The Meade, decision relied on the chilling effect on business caused by the 
cease and desist letter. See Meade, 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1159. In Douglas Furniture, the 
court determined that the cease and desist letters did not constitute tortious conduct 
in and of themselves. See Douglas Furniture, 963 F.Supp. at 902. The Douglas Furni-
ture court did not, therefore, apply the effects test and instead dismissed under the 
purposeful availment test. See id. See also Wise, 89 F.Supp. 2d at 1192. 
270 See also Myers, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1539, at *17 (allowing the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction on the basis of a mere effect in the forum state regardless of the 
absence of forum related activities). 
* J.D. candidate, 2002. B.A., Lewis & Clark College, 1997. Thanks to Holly Lar-
sen and Professor Wolcott for your tireless and helpful edits. Dedicated to Mia. 
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